The Bombay High Court recently ruled that a husband convicted of causing the dowry death of his wife is ineligible to inherit her property under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act.
Justice Nijamoodin Jamadar, sitting as a single judge, dismissed the contention of the Testamentary Department, which argued that a person convicted under Section 304-B of the IPC for dowry death should not be equated with a ‘murderer’ under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act. The department claimed that Section 25 only disqualifies those convicted under Section 302 of the IPC for murder.
The Court underscored that Section 25 of the Act disqualifies individuals involved in murder or aiding in its commission. It clarified that this provision should be interpreted to fulfill the Act’s objective of preventing property inheritance by the murderer of the deceased.
“The term ‘murder’ is not explicitly defined in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The judge noted that importing the technical definition of murder from section 300 of the IPC, which pertains to punishment under section 302 of the IPC, is inappropriate for interpreting the term ‘murder’ in the context of inheritance and succession laws. Such an approach does not align with the correct interpretation of terms used in inheritance statutes versus those used in criminal statutes,” stated the judge in the order issued on July 2nd.
Clearly, the bench pointed out that the Hindu Succession Act and the Indian Penal Code address different domains.
“Hence, the term ‘murder’ should be interpreted according to its everyday and commonly understood meaning. In this context, it signifies causing the death of the person or assisting in causing the death of the person whose property is under consideration for inheritance, by the individual facing disqualification,” clarified the judge.
Referring to Section 304-B of the IPC, the bench highlighted that a crucial element of the offense under this provision is that the death must be considered homicidal.
“It is sufficient if the death occurs under abnormal circumstances, meaning it does not happen in the usual course but under suspicious conditions, even if it does not result from burns or physical injury. The key factor is the death of a woman under the circumstances outlined in Section 304-B,” noted the bench.
The judge also recognized the legislative intent behind creating a separate offence of dowry death to combat its prevalence, noting that Parliament deemed it necessary to establish Section 304-B of the IPC for this purpose.
“It is important to acknowledge that the offence of dowry death, punishable under Section 304-B, cannot be considered a lesser offence compared to murder under Section 302,” the judge asserted.
Furthermore, the judge stated, “Upon careful consideration, it is evident that a person who causes the dowry death of a woman falls within the scope of disqualification stipulated under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, provided this fact is proven to the satisfaction of the Civil Court.”
Therefore, the judge concluded, the Testamentary Department was unjustified in challenging the petitioner (the deceased woman’s father) on the basis that the husband of the deceased was convicted under Section 304-B of the IPC, rather than Section 302.
Background
This significant ruling stemmed from a case where a father sought a declaration that his deceased daughter’s husband and in-laws, currently incarcerated, are ineligible to inherit her properties due to their conviction for her dowry death.
However, the Testamentary Department contested the father’s claim, arguing that the husband and in-laws were legal heirs of the deceased and could not be disqualified solely based on a conviction for dowry death, as the Hindu Succession Act only disqualifies those convicted of murder.
Meanwhile, the court-appointed amicus curiae argued that the disqualification was not contingent upon a specific offence under Section 302 IPC alone, and historically, it has been rooted in principles of justice, fairness, and equitable conduct.
“Fundamentally, the principle is that one should not benefit from their own wrongdoing,” the amicus curiae asserted before the court.
After weighing these arguments, the bench sided with the petitioner and the amicus curiae, rejecting the Testamentary Department’s stance.
Posted and reproduced in Public Interest by
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